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Abstract
Cognitive radio is an intelligent and adaptive radio that improves the utilization
of the spectrum by its opportunistic sharing. However, it is inherently vulnerable
to primary user emulation and jamming attacks that degrade the spectrum
utilization. In this paper, an algorithm for the detection of primary user emulation
and jamming attacks in cognitive radio is proposed. The proposed algorithm is
based on the sparse coding of the compressed received signal over a
channel-dependent dictionary. More specifically, the convergence patterns in
sparse coding according to such a dictionary are used to distinguish between a
spectrum hole, a legitimate primary user, and an emulator or a jammer. The
process of decision-making is carried out as a machine learning-based
classification operation. Extensive numerical experiments show the effectiveness
of the proposed algorithm in detecting the aforementioned attacks with high
success rates. This is validated in terms of the confusion matrix quality metric.
Besides, the proposed algorithm is shown to be superior to energy
detection-based machine learning techniques in terms of receiver operating
characteristics curves and the areas under these curves.
Keywords: Cognitive radio; jamming detection; machine learning; physical layer
security; primary user emulation detection; residual components; sparse coding
1 Introduction
Due to the rapid growth in wireless technology and services, the scarcity of the
wireless spectrum has become a major problem [1]. To meet the requirements of
future wireless networks and to alleviate this spectrum scarcity problem, cognitive
radio (CR) is one of the most promising solutions. CR allows spectrum sharing
between the primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs). More specifically, it
enables SUs to opportunistically utilize empty spectrum bands without harming
the PUs by following these steps: i) determining whether the channel is occupied
or not, ii) choosing the best part of the spectrum based on their quality of service
(QoS) requirements, iii) coordinating with other users to access the spectrum, and
iv) leaving the channel whenever a PU starts to transmit its data [2].
Although CR is a promising solution to address the spectrum shortage problem, it
is inherently vulnerable to both traditional and new security threats [3]. This is due
to the wireless nature and unique characteristics of CR. Traditional security threats
include eavesdropping, spoofing, and jamming attacks [4], while new security threats
include spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) and primary user emulation
attack (PUEA) [3, 5].
An eavesdropper tries to “hear” the secret communication between legitimate
nodes while a spoofer can modify, intercept, and replace the messages between the
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legitimate parties. On the other hand, a jammer can generate intentional interfer-
ence signals to degrade the quality of communication for both PUs and SUs. Thus,
a jammer can also prevent an SU from efficiently utilizing the white spaces of the
spectrum by causing false alarms regarding spectrum occupancy [4].
In an SSDF attack, an illegitimate node provides false sensing information to
degrade the performance of the collaborative spectrum sensing approach, where
collaborative approaches include the interaction of multiple CRs to improve the
sensing performance in the fading environment. On the other hand, PUEA is based
on emulating the characteristics of the PU transmission to deceive the SUs about
spectrum occupancy. PUEA prevents them from utilizing the existing spectrum
holes and can even cause interference to the PUs in some cases [6].
Popular PUEA types include malicious and selfish attacks. The malicious attack-
ers objective is to degrade the CRs performance by preventing them from oppor-
tunistic exploitation of spectrum. Particularly, a malicious attacker destroys the
operations of the CR network. Thus, it can stop CRs from sensing and can also
disengage the already used spectrum by them. On the other hand, a selfish attacker
aims at exploiting the space of the spectrum by preventing other secondary users
from using it. More specifically, it focuses on enhancing its consumption of the
spectrum by degrading the overall fairness of the system.
The focus of this work is to detect false alarm about the spectrum occupancy
that is caused by illegitimate nodes. An illegitimate node can transmit a signal
similar to that of a PU, considered as a primary user emulator (PUE), or can
send an unstructured signal, considered as a jamming attack. In the literature,
several solutions are proposed for illegitimate node detection. For instance, the
power level of the signal through the energy detection (ED) algorithm can decide
on the source of the signal [7] using a pre-defined threshold. In [8], the authors
presented a Markov random field-based belief propagation framework with ED for
PUEA detection. Firstly, SUs employ the energy-based algorithm and calculate the
belief values about the real source of the signal. Afterwards, the belief values are
shared between different users. Finally, the average belief value is compared with
the pre-defined threshold. If the average is less than the threshold, it is assumed
that the signal source is fake, otherwise, the source of the signal is assumed to be
real. These approaches are simple, however, they are shown to create high levels
of false alarm rates. Cross-layer techniques are also effective for illegitimate node
detection. In [9], the authors proposed a cross-layer approach for jamming attack
and PUEA detection in CR networks by using information from physical layer
spectrum sensing, statistical analysis of routing information, and prior knowledge
about PUs. This technique is effective for detecting PUEA and jamming attack.
However, there is an excessive overhead in analyzing and comparing information
from physical and network layers.
The wireless channel and inherent physical characteristics of communication de-
vices are also effective for illegitimate node detection [10–13]. For instance, wireless
channel-based detection schemes are proposed in [10–12] for PUEA detection. These
techniques are based on the fact that the channel between different transmitter-
receiver pairs is different due to its spatial decorrelation nature. In [13], the inher-
ent physical layer features of devices based on hardware impairments are exploited
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for PUEA detection. Nevertheless, these techniques require excessive software and
hardware overheads for their implementation.
Localization-based detection is also popular for PUEA detection. The basic idea is
to infer the position of the signal’s source by using the received signal and compare
it with a database of pre-known locations of legitimate PUs. However, database
management is not applicable in all scenarios [14, 15]. Similarly, the authors in [16]
used the time difference of arrival-based position estimation approach for PUEA
detection. However, this requires a strict synchronization between the receiver and
the transmitter.
Machine learning (ML)-based solutions also received considerable attention for
CR security. In [17], an anomaly detection framework for CR networks based on
the characteristics of radio propagation is proposed. However, it does not consider
specific attacks and is designed only for the detection of general anomalies. In
[18], the authors proposed a technique based on support vector data description
(SVDD) and zoom fast Fourier transform (zoom FFT). In the first step, the pilot
and symbol rate are estimated using zoom FFT. Afterwards, a boundary around
the PU objects is constructed using the SVDD classifier which is used to distinguish
between PU and PUE. However, this method does not perform well in low signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) operating conditions. Furthermore, the method fails when the
PUE is extremely intelligent (the only information unknown by the PUE is the
channel). In [19], the authors proposed an ML-based algorithm for PUEA detection
that exploits the signal strength and boundaries around the position of PU for the
correct detection. This method is good in terms of complexity but it suffers from
performance degradation.
Recently, compressive sensing (CS)-based approaches were applied in spectrum
sensing where CS offers several benefits. For example, it can alleviate the need for
high sampling rate analog-to-digital converters [20–22]. This results in a reduction
of the overall complexity, energy consumption, and memory requirements. Follow-
ing its success in various application areas [20], CS has been applied to the problem
of PUEA detection. Works along this line include PUEA detection based on CS
and received signal strength [23]. This approach needs multiple sensors throughout
the network. Hence, it increases the overall complexity. Another example consid-
ers exploiting belief propagation and CS for PUEA detection [24]. However, this
requires a centralized node for its implementation. In [25], the authors proposed
an algorithm for jamming attack detection in wide-band CR. In the first step, CS
is performed to estimate a wide-band spectrum. Afterwards, an ED algorithm is
applied to identify the occupied spectrum sub-bands. Lastly, waveform parameters
of the sub-bands are compared with the known user database to determine the
jamming attack. However, this method also requires database management.
In this paper, we propose an algorithm for PUEA and jamming attack detec-
tion corresponding to the narrow-band spectrum using the convergence patterns
of the sparse coding over channel-dependent sampled dictionary. This convergence
is characterized by the sparse coding residual signal energy decay rates. The pro-
posed algorithm does not require a centralized node or strict synchronization be-
tween transceiver ends. Moreover, it does not require information from multiple
sensors for the implementation. Furthermore, it eliminates the need for estimat-
ing the sparse coding error tolerance or the sparsity level, as typically required in
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CS-based approaches. The reason is that the sparse recovery in the proposed algo-
rithm is just used for energy convergence rate revelation rather than accurate signal
reconstruction. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• First, the decaying pattern of sparse coding is used for PUEA detection. This is
achieved by exploiting the convergence patterns of the sparse coding over a PU
channel-dependent dictionary. In this context, these patterns guide on identifying
a spectrum hole, a PU, and a PUE through ML approaches.
• Second, jamming attack detection is also performed based on the decay pattern
of sparse coding. Here, the idea is that the noise and jamming signals are not
compressible because they are not structured. So, residual energy decay patterns
with a channel-dependent dictionary along with the non-compressive nature of
jamming signals are used for efficient jamming attack detection via ML classifi-
cation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Preliminary information and the
system model are presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides the proposed algo-
rithm, while the complexity analysis is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the simulation results and discussions. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
Notation: Upper-case bold-faced, lower-case bold-faced and lower-case plain let-
ters represent matrices, vectors, and scalars, respectively. The symbols ‖.‖0 and ‖.‖2
denote the number of nonzero elements and the 2-norm of a vector, respectively.
The 〈·, ·〉, †, and C symbols represent inner product, Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse,
and complex number field.
2 Preliminaries and System Model
This section reviews background information related to CS, sparse recovery, and
ML approaches.
2.1 Compressive Sensing and Sparse Recovery
Using a random sensing matrix, CS merges data measurement and compression into
a unified operation. CS applies to compressible signals, i.e., either the explicitly
sparse signals, or the ones admitting sparsity in a certain domain [26].
Let us assume a signal vector y ∈ CN . A compressed version of y can be obtained
by applying a measurement matrix Φ ∈ CM×N as yc = Φy, where M  N . Hence,
a reduction in dimensionality from N -to-M is achieved. A high-dimensional version
of the original signal can be reconstructed from this low dimensional measurement
via sparse recovery [26].
Generally speaking, let us assume that a signal y admits sparse coding over a
dictionary (D ∈ CN×K). The signal can be represented in terms of D as y ≈Dw,
where w ∈ CK is a sparse coefficient vector. The calculation of w can be cast as
follows.
argmin
w
‖y −Dw‖22 s.t. ‖w‖0 < S, (1)
where S denotes the sparsity level of the signal. Sparse recovery is an NP-hard
problem. However, sparse recovery methods offer efficient approximate solutions.
As shown in (1), the `0 pseudo-norm is principally used to exactly quantify the
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sparsity level. However, its minimization is mathematically intractable and highly
complex. Therefore, there exist only approximate solutions to `0 minimization, such
as the matching pursuit and orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP) approaches. Al-
ternatively, this problem can be overcome by relaxing the `0 norm minimization
condition to minimizing the `1 norm which is a loose bound on sparsity. Still, `1
minimization is convex and accepts linear programming. Thus, replacing `0 mini-
mization with `1 minimization offers a significant reduction to the computational
complexity of sparse coding. However, `1 minimization requires information about
the noise level of the signal being recovered. Thus, in this work, we adopt approxi-
mate `0 minimization through the OMP algorithm
[1].
The intrinsic sparsity of the signal can be revealed by a dictionary. This dictio-
nary can be formed of fixed basis functions such as Fourier basis, Gabor functions,
wavelets, and contourlets. Alternatively, it can be generated as a learned dictio-
nary. In this setting, a dictionary is obtained by training over training data signals
Y ∈ CN×L [28]. This dictionary learning process can be formulated as
argmin
W,D
‖W i‖0 s.t. ‖Y i −DW i‖22 <  ∀ i, (2)
where  represents error tolerance. Since the problem is non-tractable and non-
convex, most of the dictionary learning algorithms perform the learning by iter-
atively alternating between a sparse representation stage and a dictionary update
stage. As an example, the K-SVD algorithm [28] is one of the widely used algorithms
for the dictionary learning process.
The above-mentioned dictionary learning is a computationally demanding pro-
cess. Therefore, developing efficient alternatives to the classical dictionary learning
approach is needed for CR-related applications [21]. In this context, the use of sam-
pled dictionaries is an efficient alternative. One can obtain a sampled dictionary
by picking a set of randomly-selected data vectors that serve for the sparse coding
without the need for applying an expensive learning process. Thus, this offers a
compromise in terms of computational complexity at a tolerable loss in the rep-
resentational power of the dictionary. In [22], the use of sampled dictionaries is
justified by their usage to represent data points in a specific class, which have a
general similarity. Similarly, sampled dictionaries are used in this work to represent
signals.
2.2 Residual Components in Pursuit Sparse Coding
A widely used sparse representation algorithm is OMP. This algorithm is based on
iteratively obtaining the coefficients in a sparse coefficient vector (w). Particularly,
each iteration identifies the location and adjusts the value of a nonzero element
in w. This is achieved by selecting one atom (column) from a dictionary D and
adjusting its respective weight.
[1]The proposed algorithm is not limited to OMP and it can be implemented with
any sparse recovery algorithm [27]. We prefer to use the OMP algorithm since it is
computationally efficient and simple.
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To implement the above-explained atom selection and coefficient update processes,
algorithms such as OMP define a so-called residual signal r. Conceptually, r rep-
resents signal portions that have not yet been represented by the selected dictio-
nary atoms. Hence, sparse coding initializes r with the signal itself, as r ← x. In
the first iteration, the sparse representation algorithm loops through all dictionary
atoms and selects the one most similar to the current residual r. Once this atom
is selected, the corresponding weight is calculated. To this end, the next residual
is calculated by subtracting the resultant one-atom sparse approximation from the
original residual. Then, the residual is considered as a new signal for which another
dictionary atom is selected and another coefficient is calculated and the process
continues until a certain halting condition is met.
The interesting point to consider in the above-explained sparse coding approach is
that the energy of the residual components should dramatically decrease as sparse
coding progresses. Intuitively, this is because more atoms are selected, and thus
more signal portions are excluded from the residual.
2.3 Machine Learning for Classification
The successful works of the ML algorithms in many application areas such as com-
puter vision, fingerprint identification, image processing, and speech recognition led
these algorithms to become appealing for the area of wireless communication [29].
These ML algorithms are categorized under three categories called supervised, un-
supervised, and reinforcement learning. Supervised learning-based ML algorithms
are widely used for classification problems when the number of present classes is
known and the information of the classes that samples belong to in the training
stage is available.
Amongst many supervised learning-based algorithms, the feed-forward neural net-
work has received growing interest in classification problems since it can recognize
classes accurately and quickly [30]. This network can be used with a single-layer
and multi-layer. Although single-layer algorithms are computationally good, these
algorithms can only be used for simple problems. Alternatively, the multi-layer-
based algorithms that include the usage of one or more hidden layers are used.
Even though these algorithms increase computational complexity, they are able to
solve more complex problems. Besides the effect of the extra layers, the number of
neurons that are used in hidden layers is also effective on the accuracy and com-
plexity performances. Therefore, it is quite significant to set these hyper-parameters
optimally. Moreover, the complexity and accuracy performances can be increased
by feature extraction (with the domain knowledge). Along this line, CS is used to
extract features in this work with the aim of increasing the performance of the ML.
2.4 System Model
The system model used is intended to characterize the existence of legitimate and
illegitimate source nodes. Thus, it consists of a PU node, an SU node, and an
illegitimate node as presented in Fig. 1. In this setting, an SU node opportunistically
exploits the spectrum in the presence of an illegitimate node that can launch either
PUEA or jamming attack. A jammer transmits a random signal, while a PU node
and a PUE transmit structured signals that mimic the legitimate PUs.
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We can represent the transmitted signal as: x = As, where A is a coefficient
matrix with a size of N×N . Each component is denoted by ai,j with i, j = 1, . . . N ,
and s = [s1(t), . . . , sN (t)]
T represents the transmitted data vector. Any coordinate
of s is given as si(t) =
∑∞
k=−∞ dku(t − kTs)ej2pifc,ot, where Ts is the symbol du-
ration, fc,o represents the center frequency, d represents digitally modulated data
symbols, u(t) represents the pulse shaping filter, and o = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The signal at the receiver sent by any node can be written as
y = hx+ n, (3)
where h is a multipath Rayleigh fading channel between any transmitter-receiver
pair and n is additive white Gaussian noise. Due to the spatial decorrelation con-
cept, the channel between different transmitter-receiver pairs is assumed to be dif-
ferent [31].
Primary 
user
PUE/jammer
Secondary 
user
False alarm about 
spectrum occupancy
Detect that PU is not 
transmitting
Send a fake structured 
or jamming signal
Figure 1 The basic system model: a PUE and a jammer want to degrade SU’s spectrum
utilization by sending fake signals.
3 The Proposed Algorithm for PUEA and Jamming Attack
Detection
The objective of this work is to differentiate between the following hypotheses:
y =

n H0 : there is no PU,
hPUxs + n H1 : a PU is present,
hixs + n H2 : a PUE is present,
hixn + n H3 : a jammer is present,
(4)
where n is additive white Gaussian noise and y is the received signal. Besides,
hPU denotes the channel corresponding to the legitimate PU, hi is the channel
corresponding to PUE or jammer, xn represents the (unstructured) jamming signal,
and xs is a structured signal. In this work, two goals are set. The first is to detect
PUEA, i.e., to differentiate between the H0, H1, and H2 hypotheses. The second
goal is to detect jamming attacks, i.e., to differentiate between H0, H1, and H3.
To meet the above-mentioned goals, a compressed version of the received signal
is observed by the CS algorithm and its sparse coding is calculated with respect to
a PU channel-depended dictionary DPU . As detailed in Section 2, sparse coding
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iteratively minimizes the energy of a residual (‖r‖2). For each iteration, we calculate
the value of ‖r‖2. Then, we quantify the rate of its decay using the gradient operator
(|G|). It is noted that the speed of this decay depends on the harmony between the
received signal and the dictionary.
The convergence profile of this residual or gradient versus iteration can be used to
distinguish between the aforementioned hypotheses. The idea behind this approach
is that the unstructured signals (noise and jamming) are not compressible, while
structured signals are compressible. Hence, different signals have different ‖r‖2 and
|G| profiles that help to distinguish between different hypotheses. Following the
same logic, different signals have different patterns based on the similarity between
the dictionary atoms and signals. In other words, residual energy patterns show
how much dictionary atoms can guarantee accurate and sparse representation for
signals that can also help in distinguishing between various hypotheses. Intuitively
speaking, a signal that is compressible in the given dictionary has a faster decay
speed compared to other signals. Thus, if the dictionary is channel-dependent, it
will also affect the pattern corresponding to ‖r‖2 and |G|, which can be used also
to differentiate between different hypotheses.
To this end, we analyze the usefulness of ‖r‖2 and |G| in distinguishing between
the aforementioned hypotheses in (4) with the following test. We use a test set of
103 quadruplets of synthetically-generated received signals (y) that correspond to
the hypotheses H0,H1, H2, and H3, respectively. In other words, one signal is mere
noise, the other one is the signal received from the legitimate PU, the third one
is a PUE signal that mimics the PU signal, and the fourth one is an unstructured
jamming signal. These signals are generated as described in Section 5.
For each quadruplet, we calculate a PU-dependent dictionary (DPU ) based on the
known PU channel (hPU ). In this work, a channel-dependent dictionary is obtained
by convolving a set of randomly selected data (X) with the channel corresponding to
the legitimate PU. Formally stated, DPU = hPU ∗X, where ∗ denotes convolution.
Afterwards, we perform an iterative sparse coding operation on a compressed version
of each signal in the quadruplet withDPU while calculating ‖r‖2. Next, we calculate
the gradient of each residual vector as |G|.
The average values of ‖r‖2 and |G| in the above-explained test are presented in
Fig. 2. In view of this figure, it is seen that one can differentiate between the four
hypotheses based on |G| and ‖r‖2 using ML approaches. For example, the gradient
of H1 has faster decay as compared to H0, H2, H3 as presented in Fig. 2 (f), Fig. 2
(e), Fig. 2 (g), and Fig. 2 (h), respectively. The reason for exhibiting a faster decay
is that the received signal in H1 (corresponding to PU) is the only one compressible
in the given dictionary.
Based on the above discussion, we present the proposed algorithm. It is divided
into two main stages. First, is a classifier training stage, where one uses a com-
prehensive set of training signals. We can either concatenate ‖r‖2 and its absolute
gradient |G| into a unified feature vector or use them separately as classification
features. These features are used to make training data sets f i0, f
i
1, f
i
2, and f
i
3
according to the hypotheses explained in (4).
For the case of PUEA detection, the training set contains f i0, f
i
1, and f
i
2 corre-
sponding to the hypotheses H0,H1, and H2, respectively. On the other hand, for the
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Figure 2 The averages of ‖r‖2 versus sparse coding iteration for received signals under
hypotheses H0, H1, H2 and H3 are in (a), (b), (c), and (d), respectively, while the averages of
|G| versus sparse coding iteration are presented in (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively.
case of jammer detection, the training set contains f i0, f
i
1, and f
i
3 corresponding
to the hypotheses H0,H1 and H3, respectively. Afterwards, these training vectors,
along with their class labels are fed to the ML training stage, where a classifier
model is trained accordingly. The workflow of the training set preparation stage is
pictorially described in Fig. 3-(a). In this figure, Yin represents the set of compressed
received signals yi0, y
i
1, y
i
2 for the case of PUEA detection or y
i
0, y
i
1, y
i
3 for the case
of jamming attack detection. Similarly, Fin represents the set of training vectors.
After classifier training, the testing stage represents the run-time operation of the
proposed algorithm. This process is explained in Fig. 3-(b). For each incoming test
signal, y, sparse coding is performed over DPU and feature vector f is obtained.
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Figure 3 An illustration of the proposed algorithm for (a) training stage, (b) testing stage.
Afterwards, f is fed into the learned classifier. Finally, this classifier will decide on
the hypothesis corresponding to the current signal of interest. An analysis of this
idea is provided in the Appendix.
4 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we roughly quantify the computational complexity of the proposed
algorithm. This complexity is primarily required by sparse coding and ML.
The OMP computational complexity at the k-th iteration is O(MK+KS+KS2+
S3) while the overall complexity is O(MKS+KS2 +KS3 +S4), where S represents
the sparsity level [32]. Thus, the overall computational complexity of sparse coding
with a sparsity level of M is O(KM2 +KM2 +KM3 +M4). This can be simplified
as O(2KM2+KM3+M4). Note that sparse coding is used during both the training
and the testing phase in the proposed algorithm.
The computational complexity of ML is divided into two main stages which are
training and testing. The computational complexity of two-layer neural network per
sample is O(e(lk +ml)) for training stage, where e denotes the number of epochs,
while k, l, and m represent the number of neurons at the input, hidden, and output
layers, respectively. The total complexity of training stage is O(ep(lk + ml)) for p
number of samples. Moreover, the computational complexity of training per sample
is roughly double as compared to the complexity of testing per sample [33]. It is
worth to note that k = 2M , since ‖r‖2 and |G| are concatenated into a unified
feature vector in the simulations.
5 Results and Discussion
This section presents numerical experiments to assess the performance of the pro-
posed algorithm comparing it with the ED approach.
5.1 Parameter Setting
The simulations are conducted with different modulation settings based on the sys-
tem model specifications presented in Section 2. The modulation types used include
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Table 1 Synthetic received signal simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Channel Model Rayleigh
No. of taps 7
Channel Delay Unit Sample Period
Signal Length 100
Oversampling Rate 10
Pulse Shaping Square-root-raised-cos.
Raised Cos. Symbol Span 50
Raised Cos. Roll-off Factor 0.2
Correlation Factor 0.9
quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM), pulse amplitude modulation (PAM),
frequency-shift keying (FSK), and phase-shift keying (PSK). Moreover, the pro-
posed algorithm uses a 100 × 400 dictionary. For each received signal, a channel
realization [34] is generated for the PU and uncorrelated channel realizations are
generated for illegitimate node based on channel decorrelation concept [31]. The
assumed model of hPU is: hPU = ρh + (1 − ρ), where ρ is the correlation factor
and h is Rayleigh fading channel [35]. The details of the simulation parameters are
presented in Table 1.
We use a standard two-layer feed-forward network [30] for that consists of a hidden
layer and an output layer with sigmoid functions. The number of hidden neurons
is set to 64 while the number of output neurons is set to the number of elements
in the target vector which is 3 (corresponding to the number of classes in PUEA
or jamming attack detection). For the case of PUEA detection, the vectors f i0, f
i
1,
and f i2 are used for training. For jamming attack detection, f
i
0, f
i
1, and f
i
3 are used
as input vectors. Energy decay rate and gradient vectors ‖r‖2 and |G| are used as
feature vectors. Here, the dimension of both ‖r‖2 and |G| is 1×M . Therefore, the
feature vector dimension 1× 2M .
It is noted that we take 4000 samples from each class in the training stage for
all cases and 1000 samples from each class in the testing stage for each of the SNR
values. Also, the neural network is trained over the SNR values ranging between
−5 dB and 15 dB with a step size of 5 dB.
5.2 Performance Analysis
This section presents the performance analysis of the proposed algorithm in terms of
confusion matrices, receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves and area under
ROC (AUROC) curves. For the jamming detection scenario, it is assumed that
the illegitimate node broadcasts non-structured signals. On the other hand, it is
assumed that PUE signal’s parameters are identical to that of PU signal.
To examine the performance of the classification, confusion matrices are often
used. They present the number of both correctly and incorrectly classified observa-
tions. Thus, diagonal elements present the number of those observations correctly
classified while off-diagonal elements indicate the number of incorrectly classified
observations.
Table 2 presents the confusion matrices for the case of PUEA detection for dif-
ferent M and SNR values, where M is the number of samples in the compressed
received signal. It is observed from Table 2 that the overall performance of the
proposed algorithm is satisfactory for PUEA detection, especially at high SNR. Be-
sides, the performance also improves with the increase in the values of M . Table 3
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presents the confusion matrices for the case of jamming detection for different M
and SNR values. It is seen from the table that the classification accuracy based on
the proposed algorithm improves with the increase in M and SNR similar to PUEA
case.
It is also observed from Tables 2 and 3 that the performance of the proposed
jammer detection outperforms PUEA detection. This is because the jammer de-
tection benefits from both the non-compressive nature of the jamming signal and
the channel-dependent dictionary while the PUEA detection benefits only from the
channel-dependent dictionary.
In classification, if a signal belongs class i and is correctly classified in to belong to
the same class, then it is said to be as true positive (TP ). If it is wrongly classified
to belong to a different class j, then it is said to be a false negative (FN). If,
however, the signal does not belong to class i and is wrongly classified as such, then
it is counted as false positive (FP ). Finally, if it does not really belong to i and
is classified to belong to i, then it is a true negative (TN). To this end, the true
positive rate (TPR) or recall can be defined as TPR = TP/(TP + FN), whereas
the false positive rate (FPR) can be defined as FPR = FP/(FP + TN). ROC
curves and AUROC curve values show the capability of a classifier to distinguish
between different classes. ROC is a probabilistic curve which is plotted with a TPR
on the vertical axis and FPR on the horizontal axis. Ideally, the TPR equals 1
and the FPR equals 0. Generally speaking, the closer the ROC curve is to the top-
left corner, the better the performance. Similarly, the higher values of the AUROC
curve shows better performance. In this work, there are three classes (H0, H1, H2
or H0, H1, H3) and ROC curve for each class is plotted separately.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 present a performance comparison of the proposed algorithm with
the ED-based ML algorithm for PUEA and jamming attack detection, respectively.
Table 2 Confusion matrices for PUEA detection.
M=30
0 dB 5 dB 10 dB
H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2
18.2 31.5 50.3 98.4 1.6 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
2.5 44.4 53.1 2.6 61.1 36.3 7.0 63.5 29.5
32.6 26.8 40.6 0.6 50.4 49.0 3.4 43.1 53.5
M=50
0 dB 5 dB 10 dB
H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2
36.0 29.4 34.6 99.4 0.6 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
1.4 37.4 61.2 2.9 71.2 25.9 7.2 71.6 21.2
35.4 16.3 48.3 0.3 52.8 46.9 5.9 45.3 48.8
M=70
0 dB 5 dB 10 dB
H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2
57.6 19.1 23.3 99.9 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
1.5 70.9 27.6 4.3 57.0 38.7 8.1 69.2 22.7
33.8 15.9 50.3 0.4 43.8 55.8 10.7 34.9 54.4
M=100
0 dB 5 dB 10 dB
H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2
88.9 6.4 4.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
1.4 81.2 17.4 1.0 53.0 46.0 4.0 79.4 16.6
32.2 6.7 61.1 0.3 17.0 82.7 3.2 35.0 61.8
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Table 3 Confusion matrices for jamming attack detection.
M=30
0 dB 5 dB 10 dB
H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2
12.5 25 62.5 98.4 1.6 0 100 0 0
0.9 44.6 54.5 2.3 54.8 42.9 3.5 58 38.5
27.3 25.6 47.1 0 27.9 72.1 1.3 26.2 72.5
M=50
0 dB 5 dB 10 dB
H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2
24.5 20.9 54.6 99.5 0.5 0 100 0 0
0.9 51.9 47.2 2.4 65.3 32.3 4.6 69.7 25.7
42.7 14.5 42.8 0 23.5 76.5 2.6 20 77.4
M=70
0 dB 5 dB 10 dB
H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2
29.8 15 55.2 99.5 0.5 0 100 0 0
0.2 63.3 36.5 2.1 65.6 32.3 4.3 74.1 21.6
37.6 14.3 48.1 0 18.7 81.3 2.6 16.4 81
M=100
0 dB 5 dB 10 dB
H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2 H0 H1 H2
58.2 3 38.8 100 0 0 100 0 0
0.3 90.6 9.1 0.7 88.8 10.5 1.1 93.8 5.1
37 3.7 59.3 0 10.7 89.3 0.2 4.9 94.9
In the case of ED-based ML, the energy of the received signals is used for the
detection of different hypotheses while using ML structure similar to the one used
for the proposed algorithm. It is observed from Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 that the ROC
curves of the proposed algorithm are closer to the top-left corner compared to
ROC curves of the ED-based algorithm for PUEA and jamming attack detection.
Moreover, Tables 4 and 5 also show that the values of AUROC of the proposed
algorithms are higher compared to the AUROC values of the ED-based algorithms
to detect different hypothesis presented in (4). For example, the proposed algorithm
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Figure 4 Comparison of the proposed algorithm with the ED-based ML algorithm for PUEA
detection using ROC curves.
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Figure 5 Comparison of the proposed algorithm with the ED-based ML algorithm for jamming
attack detection using ROC curves.
outperforms the ED-based algorithm by 2.24 % in the case of PUEA and 6.88 % in
case of jamming attack detection in terms of AUROC values. This is because the
energy patterns in the residual and gradient vector enhance the detection capability
of the proposed algorithm compared to the ED-based algorithm.
Table 4 AUROC values for PUEA.
PU Hole PUE
ED-based 0.9089 0.9560 0.8719
Proposed 0.9152 0.9828 0.8943
Table 5 AUROC values for jamming attack.
PU Hole Jammer
ED-based 0.9097 0.9542 0.8820
Proposed 0.9830 0.9637 0.9508
From an ML point-of-view, a trained model (classifier in this work) should not
memorize the inputs used in its training. To investigate this quality in the trained
ML classifier model in the proposed algorithm, Fig. 6 shows the training and testing
losses versus epochs for the PUEA detection when M = 100. In view of this figure,
it is evident that the accuracy of the training sets converges to the test set. These
results signify the absence of overfitting, thereby validating the generalizability of
the proposed model. In other words, the trained model does not memorize the
training data. Here, it should be noted that we include the loss graph only for
M = 100 case of PUEA to avoid repetition. For the other values of M and for the
jammer case we observe the similar behavior in loss graphs.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, the convergence patterns of sparse recovery are exploited for the
purpose of PUEA and jamming attack detection. Sparse recovery was conducted
over a legitimate PU channel-dependent dictionary. Consequently, the signal from
the legitimate node has smooth convergence as compared to the signal from the
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Figure 6 Model loss graph for the PUEA detection when M = 100.
illegitimate node. Essentially, this awes to the fact that this signal is the only one
compressible in the domain exclusively defined by this sparsifying dictionary. Be-
sides, the non-compressive nature of a jamming signal with sparse coding over a PU
channel-dependent dictionary was also exploited to detect jamming attacks. This de-
tection algorithm made use of ML-based approaches. Numerical experiments showed
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and its superior performance compared
to ED-based ML algorithms. These results were validated in terms of confusion
matrices, ROC curves, and values of AUROC curves, as quality metrics. In terms
of AUROC curve values, the proposed algorithm outperformed the ED-based al-
gorithm by 2.24 % in the case of PUEA and 6.88 % in case of jamming attack
detection.
Appendix Residual Energy Gradient Decay Analysis
The proposed algorithm is based on the convergence patterns in the sparse coding
of the compressed received signal. More specifically, the proposed algorithm uses a
channel-dependent dictionary to identify different characteristics of gradients and
residuals to detect PUEA and jamming attack.
In this work, we employ the computationally-efficient OMP for sparse coding. Let
us focus on its first iteration for the sake of simplicity. At the start of the first OMP
iteration, the signal itself is used to initialize the zero-th residual r0. Afterwards,
OMP chooses an atom (d) from the atoms of the given dictionary DPU that have
the strongest similarity to the r0. This similarity is characterized by the projection
corresponding to each atom as E = dd†. The updated residual after the selection
of atom can be given as
r1 = r0 −Er0. (5)
For simplicity, the least-squares refinement of OMP is ignored. With each iteration,
the residual magnitude is decreasing and the pattern of the concatenated residual
values (‖r1‖22) is used for classification.
To this end, the first element in G can be represented as
G(1) = ‖r1‖22 − ‖r0‖22 =
〈
r1, r1
〉− 〈r0, r0〉. (6)
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Using this gradient magnitude property we can differentiate the cases H0, H1,
H2, and H3. The general received signal can be given as: y = hx + n and we can
write the G(1) as follows
G(1) = ‖y − Ey‖22 − ‖y‖22. (7)
For the first hypothesis H0, x = 0. Thus, y is merely noise and can be written as
G(1)H0 = ‖n− En‖22 − ‖n‖22,
=
〈
n−En,n−En〉− 〈n,n〉,
=
〈
n,n
〉− 2〈n,En〉+ 〈En,En〉− 〈n,n〉. (8)
With respect to the properties of projection, we know that
〈
En,n
〉
=〈
En,En
〉
= ‖En22‖. Hence, (8) can be written as
G(1)H0 = −‖En‖22. (9)
Following the same logic, G(1) for H1, H2 and H3 can be expressed as follows
G(1) =
〈
hx+ n−E(hx+ n),hx+ n−E(hx+ n)〉
− 〈hx+ n,hx+ n〉,
= a− 2b+ c− d, (10)
where a, b, c and d are defined next. Specifically, a can be written as
a =
〈
hx+ n,hx+ n
〉
,
=
〈
hx+ hx
〉
+
〈
hx+ n
〉
+
〈
hx+ n
〉
+
〈
n+ n
〉
,
=
〈
hx+ hx
〉
+ 2
〈
hx+ n
〉
+
〈
n+ n
〉
. (11)
Assuming that the noise is independent of hx,
〈
hx+ n
〉
= 0, we can write (11)
as
a =
〈
hx+ hx
〉
+
〈
n+ n
〉
. (12)
By its turn, b can be expressed as
b =
〈
hx+ n,E(hx+ n)
〉
,
=
〈
hx+ n,Ehx+ En
〉
,
=
〈
hx,Ehx
〉
+
〈
hx,En
〉
+
〈
n,Ehx
〉
+
〈
n,En
〉
,
=
〈
Ehx,Ehx
〉
+
〈
hx,En
〉
+
〈
n,Ehx
〉
+
〈
En,En
〉
,
=
〈
Ehx,Ehx
〉
+
〈
En,En
〉
, (13)
where
〈
hx,En
〉
=
〈
n,Ehx
〉
= 0.
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Moreover, c can be expressed as
c =
〈
E(hx+ n),E(hx+ n)
〉
,
=
〈
Ehx+En,Ehx+En
〉
,
=
〈
Ehx,Ehx
〉
+
〈
En,En
〉
. (14)
Lastly, d can be given as
d =
〈
hx+ hx
〉
+
〈
n+ n
〉
= a. (15)
Based on (12), (13), (14) and (15), and making the appropriate substitution, G(1)
can be written as
G(1) = a− 2b+ c− d,
= −2〈Ehx,Ehx〉− 2〈En,En〉
+
〈
Ehx,Ehx
〉
+
〈
En,En
〉
,
= −〈Ehx,Ehx〉− 〈En,En〉. (16)
Finally, the generic expression of the gradient magnitude for hypotheses H1, H2
and H3 can be expressed
G(1)H1,H2,H3 = −‖Ehx‖2 − ‖En‖2, (17)
where h corresponds to hPU in case of PU or hi in case of PUE/jammer as explained
in (4). Moreover, x will be structured in case of PU and PUE, while unstructured
in the case of a jamming attack.
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